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ABSTRACT
This comparative study analyses the experience of Italy and Malaysia in the design and execution of
performance management systems at the state level. The article investigates how performance
management systems have changed over the past decades, the motivations behind their meta-
morphoses, their common elements across the two countries, and what accounts for the respective
progress. It also investigates the role that the institutional framework plays in making performance
management systems robust. The study presents policy recommendations on how governments
can create more robust performance management systems for enhanced accountability and
transparency in an age of resource constraint.
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Introduction
Countries across the world have introduced periodically
administrative reforms. These reforms have aimed to
modernize their public administration so that their public
sector can render services to citizens and the community
better, at lower costs and at affordable prices. Many of
these reforms are the inexorable march of public admin-
istrative modernization. Practices of more advanced
countries tend to inform the content and process of
reform in developing countries.
Performance management is one key area of public
administrative reform. This is because performance
management is an integral part of the public service
delivery mechanism. It is a process by which a public
organization can assess whether it is delivering the right
services—according to its mission and objectives—in the
right amount, at the right cost, and at the right time.
Performance measurement therefore requires an orga-
nization to set the objectives of its operations and
develop meaningful performance indicators to measure
performance (the quantity, quality, efficiency, and out-
comes of services provided). Against these indicators,
targets of performance are set to meet the goals. And,
at the end of the process, performance management
requires an assessment whether these performance tar-
gets have been achieved and what follow-up action is
required based on this assessment (Bouckaert &
Halligan, 2008).
Italy and Malaysia have been chosen as units of
analysis for their commonalities and contrasts. In
terms of commonalities, both Italy and Malaysia have
been active in the area of performance management
reform. And this involvement in performance manage-
ment has spanned in both cases well over four decades.
Being at the opposite ends of the development spec-
trum, the two countries offer a perspective as to how
performance management reforms in these countries
have progressed and what have been critical to their
respective progress. Malaysia is an example of a middle-
income country seeking to become a developed nation.
Accordingly, its budgets are growth oriented and per-
formance management seeks to ensure that value-for-
money in public expenditures. Italy is a developed indus-
trial nation. It is therefore interesting to see how both
these countries fare in performance management with a
different socioeconomic milieu and institutional struc-
ture. Accordingly, this study offers the evolution and
state of performance management in a developed coun-
try (Italy) and a developing country (Malaysia).
Admittedly, the study cuts across differing cultures.
Notwithstanding, the values of the public sector of
these two countries are similar: improving public ser-
vices, integrity and accountability, among others. Given
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that the central purpose of performance management
in improving public services is overarching in both the
jurisdictions, the study should throw light on the cri-
tical success factors in the design and execution of
performance management systems (PMS) across
jurisdictions.
The study expands the stock of literature on com-
parative performance management (see, e.g., Radin
(2003). Evidently, a two-country analysis cannot be
definitive about a government’s capability to introduce
PMS. That only tentative conclusion can be drawn
from comparing things that are strictly noncomparable
is endemic to all comparative studies. Notwithstanding,
the Italy-Malaysia analysis should be able to highlight
similarities and differences in the reform effort in that
set of countries. Such a comparative approach offers a
better insight into factors conditioning success than a
single-country study.
In theory, a similar reform as the PMS should
evolve along similar lines and have similar outcomes.
Any divergence in the experience would then allow
us to determine the reasons for success or failure.
The pooled experience of reform in different settings
can then lead us to a larger evaluation of the practice
of PMS (Xavier, 1996c).
Research method
The grounded-theory approach heavily influenced this
study. It enabled the use of different qualitative
research approaches—direct observation, interviews,
and analysis of secondary data on PMS. The empirical
investigation was conducted through visits to selected
ministries and agencies to assess the progress of PMS
during the second-half of 2015. Primarily, data were
gathered through 20 semi-structured interviews with
authorities responsible for managing PMS systems
across the two jurisdictions. Interviews were generally
about an hour long. At the outset, the interviewees were
notified of the researchers’ backgrounds and the pur-
pose of the interview. The interviews were semi-
structured with roughly 10 questions guiding the inter-
view while allowing space to explore issues raised by
the respondents in greater depth.
Obtaining access to the relevant respondents in
both countries posed little difficulty as the inter-
views were conducted on the basis that views
expressed will not be attributable to a particular
respondent. Notes were taken of the respondents’
responses. These were reviewed and subdivided
into themes that helped to sport consensus over
the issues being investigated.
The respondent samples are not necessarily repre-
sentative of the larger public service effort in PMS in
the two jurisdictions. Greater representativeness was
endeavored further through studying secondary
sources. The views expressed and data from documen-
tary sources were triangulated to arrive at a consensus
of the state of PMS implementation in the two coun-
tries (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987). These 20
interviews and documentary sources offered deep
insights into the PMS effort in both the countries.
Following this process, findings were generated in
order to develop an understanding of the critical suc-
cess factors of PMS in both the jurisdictions.
Theoretical framework
Performance management is an agenda, and a critical
one too, for governments across the world seeking to
improve services. A performance management system
that is designed well and supported by the political and
institutional structure can promote development and
better service delivery. Indeed, a culture of perfor-
mance—results and customer orientation—can
enhance the public sector efficiency and effectiveness,
which in turn enhances business efficiency and effec-
tiveness (Bianchi, 2016, chapter 2). Consequently, the
nation’s competitiveness is sharpened.
Performance management systems start with the
identification of key result areas. Expected outcomes
are identified for these key result areas for which key
performance indicators and performance targets are
developed, measured, and reported for improving pub-
lic services. These performance management systems
have a central platform. These platforms, albeit similar,
are known by different names. They are called frame-
work agreements and agency plans in the UK. In
Denmark and Malaysia they are known as budget con-
tracts, while in Australia, US, France and in the state-
owned enterprises in the OECD they are known as
performance agreements. These agreements are usually
between the minister and the CEO of the organization
and/or between the central budget authority (ministry
of finance) and the CEOs of ministries. These contracts
are executed to commit the ministry heads to a set of
performance standards for the budget and the flexibility
offered in resource use.
Bouckaert and Halligan (2008) found from their
comparative study of six countries that performance
management has yet to mature as an effective organiza-
tional system to improve performance in the public
sector. Acknowledging the limitations of existing per-
formance management models, they suggest that
greater comparative research be carried out to
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determine the critical success factors for effective per-
formance management systems in the public sector.
This section reviews the literature to establish what
factors have been instrumental in the development
and management of public performance management
systems.
In the implementation of a performance manage-
ment in the public sector, the role of leadership—poli-
tical and bureaucratic—is essential in securing results
and in obtaining reliable performance information for
decision making (Moynihan & Ingraham, 2004). Other
studies have also found that the PMS has been instru-
mental in improving government performance when
the following conditions hold: clear strategic direction
that is aligned to national priorities, outcomes-based
key performance indicators (KPIs) and performance
targets, skills and interest of the ministers to monitor
the performance of their CEOs, staff work targets are
aligned to ministry or department targets, budget flex-
ibility and accountability, and follow-through and fol-
low-up on the review of performance results (Adam,
2011; De Waal, 2013; Xavier, 2009, 1996c).
To conduct the comparative analysis of PMS in Italy
and Malaysia we have also used the framework adopted
in Bianchi and Rivenbark (2012, pp. 522–525). This
framework identifies cultural and organizational struc-
tures, legislation, leadership, informational infrastruc-
tures, and performance indicators as key components
for the success of PMS reforms. The comparison of the
evolution and progress of PMS in these two countries
will address whether the critical success factors high-
lighted in the literature are common across the two
jurisdictions despite their differing levels of
development.
The following sections on PMS in Italy and Malaysia
confirm that many of the critical success factors identi-
fied by previous research prevail in both jurisdictions,
albeit differing in approach and content.
Performance management in Italy
This section traces the evolution of the PMS. It high-
lights the shifting approaches to reform as well as
identifies the critical success factors that account for
the progress of PMS reform.
In the past three decades, Italy has produced a sig-
nificant effort in setting the rules on PMS in the public
sector. Since the beginning of the 1980s, both increas-
ing financial problems in the Italian public sector and a
rising dynamic complexity have been major causes of
an intensive legislation leading to administrative
reforms. Such reforms included the introduction of
planning and control systems (P&C) to ensure greater
efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure and
the development of a performance management culture
in public sector organizations.
Five interconnected steps have helped the Italian
state set rules on the design and use of P&C to foster
public sector performance management. Such steps can
be framed as follows:
a. Monitoring the financial equilibrium of munici-
palities and other local authorities;
b. Financial control, operated on behalf of the poli-
tical level, on the efficiency and effectiveness in
resource allocation by managers in the state and
local public sector organizations;
c. Financial budgeting and planning;
d. Integrating financial budgeting with strategic
planning; and
e. Embodying budgeting and strategic planning into
a broader performance management cycle.
Monitoring financial equilibrium at municipal level
The first major step toward public sector performance
management undertaken by the Italian legislation dates
back to 1986, when the legislative decree No. 318 pro-
vided specific precautionary measures to counteract the
risk of emerging financial deficits in municipal admin-
istrations, due to unrecorded liabilities. The Act
No. 142/1990 (art. 51, 55, and 57) set forth specific
rules regarding the reorganization of municipal offices
and service delivery. It stated the principle of separation
of roles between political leaders and administrators.
This Act also prescribed specific rules for local public
sector institutions in terms of financial planning and
accounting. Two fundamental principles behind the
pursuit of financial equilibrium and transparency were
set, that is, (1) expenditures can be authorized only if
enough revenues are available to afford them, and (2)
no accounting adjustments between specific collections
and disbursements must be operated. Furthermore, this
Act attributed to the accounting auditors the role to
carry out internal control.
Financial control on the efficiency and
effectiveness in resource allocation
Legislative decree No. 29/1993 reinforced the principle
of separation of roles between political leaders and
administrators while focusing attention on monitoring
managerial results, as a prerequisite for the pursuit
of financial equilibrium. Such effort was still
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predominantly centered on the financial side of perfor-
mance management.
In particular, this decree prescribed that, in each
Ministry, at the beginning of every year a report on
the results achieved in the previous year should have
been submitted by managers to their own general man-
ager, and by the general manager to the minister.
Also, it was prescribed that, in each Ministry, speci-
fic autonomous “Internal Control” (or “Performance
Evaluation”) units would have been established to sup-
port elected officials to assess managerial performance.1
Although the task of the “Internal Control” units
was still mainly bounded to a financial domain and to
only a support to the elected officials in evaluating
managers in the implementation of political goals, the
decree No. 29/1993 introduced a major innovation
toward the adoption of PMS in the public sector. In
fact, it outlined how the function of the control unit is
different from that of an auditing unit. The autonomy
of planning, control, and results evaluation from inter-
nal auditing was therefore stated for the first time by
the Italian law.
Financial budgeting/planning
This third evolutionary stage of performance manage-
ment sought to combine the focus on the pursuit of
financial equilibrium with the need to carry on P&C
over the financial results. An important effort at this
stage was public sector accounting reform. Since the
Act No. 468 was issued in 1978, the Italian legislator
has gradually supported the introduction in the
national budgeting system of an accrual and cash-
based mixed approach (Caperchione & Mussari, 2002,
p. 308; Mussari, 2005). Also, harmonizing accounting
systems of the Italian public sector institutions at dif-
ferent levels (state, region, municipality) by adopting
homogeneous charts of accounts has been considered
as an important step to pursue financial equilibrium in
the extended Italian system to comply with the stability
pact adopted in 1997 by the member states of the
European Union. Such effort has been pursued by
several acts, starting from the law No. 196/2009 (art.
2), to the legislative decree No. 91/2011 (art. 4).
The accounting system plays a central role in the
Italian state planning process: in fact, it drives the
drawing up of financial statements to report both
planned and actual results on expenditures and reven-
ues. Concerning this, the legal framework primarily
addresses accounting and balance sheet activities, but
constitutes an important basis in terms of planning.
The Act No. 39/2011 (art. 2) prescribes the structure
of the financial planning cycle for the Italian state.2 The
current system requires the government to submit an
annual budget proposal, along with a three-year finan-
cial plan, to the legislature for each forthcoming
fiscal year. The budget proposal is the result of a synth-
esis of the budget proposals submitted to the prime
minister and the Ministry of Economy and Finance
(MEF) by the ministers. While the budget proposals
can be characterized as more of a financial exercise
than an evaluation of goals and outcomes, the three-
year financial plan requires a level of strategic thinking
beyond the forthcoming fiscal year.
Integrating financial budgeting with strategic
planning
The fourth state in the metamorphosis of the Italian
legal framework into formal performance management
systems can be evinced in the attempt to integrate
financial budgeting into a wider strategic planning per-
spective, by using an organizational and managerial
approach. This stage can be related to the introduction
of “Internal Control” units as facilitators of the P&C
process.
The major change toward the goal of establishing
formal performance management systems in the Italian
public sector has been made by the legislative decree
No. 286/1999. This decree prescribed Italian public
sector organizations adopted proper “internal control”
tools, aimed at internal auditing, assessment of effi-
ciency and effectiveness in public expenditure (manage-
ment control), and assessment of the level and quality
of implementation of public policies (strategic control).
The perspective adopted by the Italian legislator to
cluster different kinds of controls was the positioning of
the control unit in the organization being “controlled.”
So, “internal” controls were distinguished from “exter-
nal” controls, since the latter are performed by third
institutions (e.g., a court of auditors), usually with the
primary purpose to verify whether administration is
carried out in compliance to formal rules.
Notwithstanding, this perspective did not focus yet on
the true nature of performance management.
Related to management control, the decree No. 286/
99 identified a set of core functions of management
control. Other core tasks were referred to the measure-
ment of performance standards, the selection of perfor-
mance indicators, and reporting.
The same decree outlined strategic control as an
activity carried out by a unit responsible to the minis-
ter. It prescribed that strategic control should focus, at
both planning and post-action level, on how managers
implement public policies, missions, and strategic
objectives. The identification of obstacles,
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responsibilities, and solutions to the implementation of
public policies were mentioned as core strategic control
functions. Three main strategic control activities were
distinguished, namely, performance evaluation of first-
line managers, supporting them in identifying problems
and solutions, and linking strategic planning to
implementation.
To implement strategic and management control
(and link them to each other), the decree prescribed
that each minister should annually issue a directive,
that is, a main strategic planning document embodying
the inter-sectoral goals outlined by the prime minister,
and the corresponding strategic objectives for each
sector of public administration.
It is apparent that planning is tightly ruled by the
legislation. Notwithstanding, it is possible to perceive a
dual nature of such a process in the Italian public
sector. One part of the system is the process of prepar-
ing the proposed budget and three-year financial plan.
The other part of the system, known as the directive, is
the process through which the prime minister and each
of the ministries issue a political document formalizing
the next fiscal year’s strategic goals (Ministry of
Economy and Finance, 2013).
Each ministerial directive also contains a series of
action plans, that is, the documents through which the
resources allocated to the various departments are spe-
cified and associated with activities to achieve their
respective goals and objectives. An action plan forma-
lizes the performance measures and targets agreed on
between the minister and the department heads, as well
as the timeframe for which performance will be
assessed.
While action plans and corresponding performance
reports are supposed to define the financial resources
allocated for each action and objective, in relation to
each department, this does not happen in practice.
There are a couple of reasons for this disconnect
between departmental budgets and action plans. One
is associated with weak financial management systems,
while another can be attributed to the weak perfor-
mance management culture.3
The law also requires an association between perfor-
mance management systems and annual personnel eva-
luations. This relationship helps determine the financial
bonuses that are given to managers within each minis-
try (Decree No. 150/2009).
Incorporating budgeting and strategic planning
into a broader performance management cycle
Decree No. 150/2009 marks the fifth stage in the meta-
morphosis of formal performance management systems
as ruled by the Italian law in line with the OECD
reforms (OECD, 2010, pp. 19–29). The main problems
confronted by this reform can be summarized accord-
ing to the following principles:
● Planning, performance, and evaluation are a con-
tinuous process rather than a succession of frag-
mented and isolated events. Therefore, a
performance management cycle should be consis-
tently managed (see Merchant, 1982).
● Strategic planning and operational budgeting must
be linked to financial planning and balance sheets
accounting, in order to make the dual budgeting
process internally consistent.
● Performance must be measured and evaluated at
two stages: organizational and individual. The for-
mer concerns the implementation of outcome
measures on a departmental level. The latter refers
to the contribution of individual employees.
● Performance management implies the proper use
of objectives and performance indicators.
Monitoring performance and implementing peri-
odic corrective action also are required.
● A performance plan must be outlined every year,
involving elected officials and administrators.
● A common methodology must be adopted to
design and implement performance management
systems by different Italian public sector
institutions.
● Independent program evaluations are required by
oversight units, outside of political and managerial
control.
● The public sector must ensure transparency
toward citizens and the community: to this end,
user-satisfaction surveys can become a powerful
performance management tool, to connect front
offices with back offices in the public sector
(Bianchi, 2010, 2012; Flamholtz, 1996, p. 18;
Doran, 1981).
Perhaps the major structural innovation operated by
the Decree No. 150 can be related to the discipline of
performance evaluation. Here, the independence of
evaluators is emphasized. The law sets for each Italian
public sector institution, two new kinds of units, that is:
(1) the “Committee for the evaluation, transparency,
and integrity of public administrations” (OECD, 2013)
and the (2) “Independent Unit for Performance
Evaluation” (Bigoni & Deidda Gagliardo, 2013, p. 408).
The “Committee” was configured as a central admin-
istration unit that would have carried out three main
roles: (1) to support the political and managerial levels
in adopting performance management systems, (2) to
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support the “Independent Unit for Performance
Evaluation” in managing the critical issues detected in
carrying on its function, (3) to ensure public administra-
tion transparency and undertaking anticorruption
practices.4
The “Independent Units for Performance Evaluation”
are mainly in charge of: (1) monitoring the managerial
performance evaluation system, (2) validating perfor-
mance reports, and (3) checking the fairness of perfor-
mance measurement. Such units are located—in a
position of autonomy—in each of the ministries or
agencies of a public sector institution.
A formal performance evaluation system is adopted
by ministries, usually including a major consideration
of the technical expertise of the manager to handle the
activities embodied in the performance plan and for
organizational leadership portrayed by the manager in
the observed time span. The evaluation of each man-
ager is performed by the incumbent of the next-higher
hierarchical position; however, its ultimate validation
depends on the decision of the “Independent Unit for
Performance Evaluation.”
The Decree 150/2009 has significantly amended the
previous legislation. In fact, although it sets a specific
unit for performance evaluation, it does not establish
any corresponding staff units to support the political
and administrative levels to carry on the other perfor-
mance cycle activities. It just prescribes that each minis-
ter, with the collaboration of department heads, must
annually issue a directive with a three-year performance
plan. Also, they must annually monitor the emerging
results from the implementation of performance plans,
based on which they will submit performance reports.
Although the law does not prescribe anymore that a
strategic control staff unit must be set up in each
ministry cabinet, the need to outline robust directives
and performance plans requires that a group of stra-
tegic P&C analysts facilitates the planning process.
Such analysts should play an active role inside cabinets
in fostering a strategic dialogue with administrative
levels in identifying—with the collaboration of depart-
ment management control units—the operational
objectives, as well as performance standards and mea-
sures on which administrators will be made accoun-
table, to attain the strategic goals. Unfortunately, the
P&C staffs often do not have consolidated practices
and possess limited skills regarding performance
management.
An outcome of the weak performance management
culture, the lack of consolidated leadership in carrying
out the profession, and the limited technical support
can be found in the vagueness that often characterizes
the strategic goals and the disconnection of operational
objectives from strategic targets included in the direc-
tives of the various ministries. It is not uncommon for
operational objectives to be defined merely as activity
descriptions, rather than measurable objectives and
outcomes.
While these and other challenges still place the Italian
state in the early stages of the maturity process of per-
formance management, the legal framework seems to
push the public sector down the road toward the adop-
tion of formal performance management systems.
One may argue that laws and rules, together with
training, have produced a few (maybe still marginal or
even erratic) improvements that have been cyclically
creating hope, as well as sudden discouragement,
about possible future developments in the Italian state.
Performance management in Malaysia
Administrative reform in the Malaysian public service
has been largely politically inspired and at times politi-
cally driven. Accordingly, performance management
reform has always been high on the government
agenda. Given the priority accorded to performance
management, Malaysia’s experience in developing
PMS has gained the distinction of being made an
inspiration among developing countries, especially as
they pursue public management reform.
Evolution of performance management
The first seeds of performance management were
planted in 1968 with the introduction of the Planning
and Programming Budgeting System (PPBS).5 The
PPBS sought to allocate budgets across government
programs on the basis of planned levels of service
delivery. This performance-based system of resource
allocation was to transform the PMS from an input-
based to an output-based system.
However, its lackluster performance—the lack of per-
formance targeting, measurement, and the nonexistence of
performance evaluation—and as a performance manage-
ment tool caused the Ministry of Finance to make radical
modifications to PPBS in 1988 (Xavier, 1996a). These
modifications—titled the Modified Budgeting System
(MBS)—sought to resuscitate performance measurement
annually and the long-term program evaluation to revive
the principle of budgeting based on planned performance.6
Performance agreements became the vehicle to do so.
These agreements were commitments by ministry heads
to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to a set of performance
targets for each activity in their budget structure for the
proposed level of funding. They aimed to explicitly relate
outputs with the cost of producing them (Xavier, 1996b).7
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To fortify performance measurement and introduce
output costing, the Malaysian Administrative
Modernization and Management Planning Unit of the
Prime Minister’s Department (MAMPU) introduced
the Micro-Accounting System (MAS) in 1987 and
further revamped it in 1992.8 By enabling agencies to
identify the cost of their outputs, the MAS allowed
budgets to be prepared by compiling the costs of the
planned levels of outputs.
Closely on the heels of the MBS, the government
introduced the Productivity Improvement initiative
1991.9 This initiative was to help identify performance
indicators that would be useful under MBS. Ministries
and agencies were required to measure productivity in
terms of time, cost, and manpower. And these mea-
surements were to be compared across time or to
standards to determine the relative level of efficiency
of the agencies.
As if these initiatives were not enough to instill a
culture of performance within the public service, the
government introduced the Total Quality Management
or TQM in 1992.10 TQM emphasized the importance of
results from government operations, customer orienta-
tion in public service delivery (TQM required an
agency to identify clients and document clients’
needs), and the importance of quality control, at the
level of both process and final output. Again, this new
initiative was to build on past schemes of performance
management. It was to keep the issue of performance
management alive in the civil service.
To further ensure quality in service delivery, minis-
tries were required to draw up their clients’ charter
beginning 1993.11 The Clients’ Charter took the TQM
a notch higher. It not only emphasized customer orien-
tation in the public service. It also committed the public
service to a set of publicly documented commitments
on the quality and timeliness of the services provided.
Clients then had an opportunity to know at what level
of quality a particular public service would be rendered
to them. They would then be able to evaluate the
performance of a public agency and compare the stan-
dards of performance with those of other comparable
agencies locally and abroad. They would then have a
right to complain were these service standards not met.
To further build on the TQM emphasis on process
quality control, government agencies actively pursued
the MS ISO 9001 certification (and other subsequent
versions) as of 1996.12 The ISO was to document the
processes involved in producing a particular service.
Duplication or unnecessary processes were to be elimi-
nated. A streamlined process of service delivery should
result in good process control. That in turn should
ensure the quality of the final product.
Benchmarking joined the performance management
reform list in 1999.13 Benchmarking sought to
strengthen the public service culture of performance
by requiring agencies to emulate best practices—locally
and abroad—in the related areas of service delivery.
Benchmarking was to motivate agencies to set stan-
dards of performance against the best in the world.
The 2005 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) initia-
tive by MAMPU further invigorated the PMS.14 KPIs
were to be developed by agencies to measure the quality
of service delivery. This KPI initiative was strengthened
and supplemented by the 2007 MoF Strategic KPI
initiative. This initiative required agencies to identify
strategic result areas and strategic KPIs to measure the
results of operations in these strategic areas. Agencies
were also to identify KPIs and targets to measure out-
comes or impact. The achievement of these targets is a
form of accountability for the public funds expended
on a particular program. Information from perfor-
mance measurement and monitoring could then be
used to further improve performance.
The 2006 saw the auditor-general evaluating the
financial management performance of ministries and
rating their performance annually on the basis of stars.
A one-star rating would denote a deplorable state of
financial management, while a four-star rating would
mean that the financial management of the ministry is
excellent. The criteria for the financial management
system rating comprise the core areas in financial man-
agement. These include budget planning and execution,
revenue collection, asset management, procurement,
payments, and financial record keeping. The star rating
enables ministries to assess where they stand in relation
to others in financial management. Such a relative
standing helped apply pressure on ministries to not
only buck up, should they have not scored well, but
also to maintain their rating should they have per-
formed exceptionally well.
In 2007, MAMPU also came up with its star rating
system to score the overall performance of a ministry’s
management. MAMPU’s five-star rating assessed a
ministry’s performance from poor—warranting only
one star—to excellent and deserving of five stars. The
criteria of assessment include strategic planning and
evaluation of execution, human resource management,
financial management, policy and program formula-
tion, execution and evaluation and complaints
management.
The rating system of the auditor-general and MAMPU
has put pressure upon agencies to continually seek out
improvements in public and financial management so
that they can secure the most prestigious rating (Xavier,
2009).
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A performance scorecard for ministry heads was intro-
duced in 2007 to further augment the PMS. This initiative
combines the individual performance of the ministry head
and that of his or her organization to determine the min-
istry head’s performance.
Recognizing that the heads of department would
need the support of their deputies in accomplishing
their KPI targets, the government extended the KPI
project to the deputy ministry heads as well. The KPI
targets of the ministry heads are cascaded to the per-
formance scorecard of the deputies (Xavier, 2009).
In 2010, the government introduced the
Government Transformation Program (GTP). Unlike
the previous reforms that applied service-wide, the
GTP takes on a focused approach to service delivery.
Ministers who are responsible for the seven national
key result areas are given a performance scorecard with
performance targets. The rest of the cabinet ministers
too are given a performance scorecard for their respec-
tive ministries. All ministers are accountable to the
prime minister for the achievement of their perfor-
mance targets. The agency made responsible was the
Performance Management and Delivery Unit at the
Prime Minister’s Department (PEMANDU).
The new outcomes-based budgeting system (OBB)
implemented on a pilot basis from 2012 seeks to get agen-
cies to measure not just outputs but also outcomes and
impact of public expenditure. OBB also requires agencies
to evaluate the success of the programs against their goals,
thereby resuscitating the initiative of previous performance
management reforms respecting program evaluation.
Accrual accounting is the latest accounting initiative
to help capture the full costs of service delivery. That
way a better understanding can be obtained on the
efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditure.
These institutions offered the P&C systems to make
the PMS robust. KPIs and target-setting were jointly
done between the central authorities and the ministries.
Periodic monitoring, year-end evaluation, and feedback
to central authorities, especially to the prime minister,
and ministers kept PMS robust.
Summary and findings
Despite their differing stages in economic development,
both Italy and Malaysia show commonalities in their
reform approach, experience, and the critical success
factors in the PMS reform. This section highlights a
number of interesting findings that might enable a
discussion on the policy recommendations and organi-
zational strategies to sustain public sector reforms
toward the adoption of more robust PMS for higher
levels of accountability and transparency.
Reform motivation and progress
In both the nations we observe that reform implemen-
tation was a result of a necessity. Such a necessity for
reform was born out of a fiscal crisis or a political crisis
consequent to an erosion of public trust in government.
In Malaysia, for example, the Government
Transformation Plan (GTP) was a consequence of the
ruling coalition losing their majority in the parliament
(Iyer, 2011). Accordingly, the early efforts of PMS
reform focused on improving the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of resource allocation in both the countries.
While that concern remained the recurring theme in
subsequent reforms, the necessity to modernize public
administration too has underpinned efforts at PMS
reform. Such modernization was to demonstrate to an
increasingly skeptical public that the government was
indeed serious on improving public services.
The political motivation to reform is also evident in
both the countries. Indeed, in most instances, the poli-
tical level has been instrumental in driving PMS
reforms. In Italy, the political motivation is evidenced
in the slew of legislation introducing and reforming
PMS. In Malaysia, the PMS reforms have been largely
at the direction of the political leadership and admin-
istrative fiat (Siddiquee, 2010).
Reforms were not conducted in isolation of previous
ones. We see in both countries, subsequent reforms
incorporating the components of the older set of reforms.
In this way, reforms were incremental and consistent
with past efforts. Building on the older reforms lent
further legitimacy to the new initiatives while maintain-
ing the momentum of PMS reform effort.
PMS and public administration paradigm
PMS reform in both the countries has broadly
reflected the changing paradigm of public adminis-
tration. The introduction of the earlier set of reforms
in the 1970s through 1990s mirrored the shift from
progressive public administration, with its focus on
inputs and procedural compliance, to outputs and
efficiency. The latter move was in line with the dic-
tates of the New Public Management (NPM) para-
digm. More recent reforms, while still true to NPM,
marked a shift to the responsive governance or the
public value paradigm (see O’Flynn, 2007; World
Bank, 2012). The GTP in Malaysia especially, with
its focus on crime, corruption, poverty, urban trans-
portation, cost of living, and rural infrastructure
development, was a clear response to the needs and
concerns of the public.
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Culture and organizational structures
The second lesson from the comparative study is that the
design and implementation of PMS in national govern-
ments must recognize the difficulty of transforming cul-
ture and organizational structures. Through a constant
stream of PMS reforms, both the governments hoped to
cultivate a culture of performance in their respective
jurisdictions.
Our study supports Pollitt’s (2006) contention that
centralized governments are more adept at perfor-
mance management than decentralized governments.
In both the Italian and Malaysian systems, the planning
process is centered at (or co-ordinated by) the prime
minister level. That enabled more effective reform poli-
cies and their co-ordination and implementation across
ministries. However, in Italy, public officials’ sensitivity
to the demands of their own constituents has at times
hindered the prime minister’s ability to implement
policies across ministries and has compromised perfor-
mance issues of efficiency and effectiveness of public
expenditure (Ongaro & Valotti, 2008).
On a more micro-perspective, another relevant orga-
nizational issue can be related to the formal identifica-
tion of specific staff units supporting the political and
administrative levels in carrying out the performance
management cycle (Bianchi, 2016). Whether explicit
formal units supporting the P&C process are beneficial
or not to the performance of PMS cannot be demon-
strated. However, both the countries have set up inde-
pendent evaluation units, reform institutions (such as
MAMPU and PEMANDU) and processes to help poli-
tical and administrative masters to assess performance
objectively, draw ministries’ attention to critical issues
in service delivery and to pursue a more outcome-
oriented approach in performance management (see
Barber, 2009).
Additionally, internal audit units in the ministries of
both the governments have also sought to make P&C
controls more robust to ensure efficiency and effective-
ness of public expenditure.
Legislation
The third lesson that can be drawn from our compara-
tive research is that an elaborate structure of legislation,
which prescribes the adoption of a formal PMS, does
not guarantee success. In Italy, regulations under-
pinned the progress of PMS. In Malaysia, administra-
tive fiats and dedicated central reform bodies drove
PMS. Notwithstanding, the slow progress to an out-
come-based performance management approach and
the lack of a clear nexus between public expenditure
and outcomes is testimony to the impotency of legisla-
tion, administrative diktat, and even dedicated reform
bodies to bring about such changes.
Notwithstanding, the laws and directives fostered a
sense of urgency toward the implementation of inno-
vative methods of performance management. In both
Italy and Malaysia, there was a gradual evolution of
their respective legislative frameworks from an input
to output and finally toward outcome measurement.
Without a major improvement in professional skills,
an organizational structure that is geared to measuring
performance and following up on the results, and a shift
from compliance to continuous learning, public admin-
istrations will not be able to pursue an outcomes-based
approach to performance management with vigor.
Political and administrative leadership
A fourth lesson from our comparative study is the need
for political and administrative leadership.
Notwithstanding legislation on PMS, political leader-
ship plays a key role in setting the agenda for perfor-
mance management reform. While the political
leadership sets the tone and tempo of reform, admin-
istrators play the key role in managing the planning
process, creating the informational infrastructure and
coordination mechanisms, selecting the performance
measures, and evaluating the results.
The outcome from this finding is that administrators
must work with their political masters to bring about
improvements in public services. Governments must
identify and cultivate champions of performance man-
agement. This implies a need for leadership from
elected officials, agency directors, and P&C staff in
creating meaningful performance measures and pro-
moting program evaluation (Kelly & Rivenbark, 2008).
Informational infrastructure
A fifth lesson is the need for an informational infra-
structure to support performance management.
Without a system-wide informational structure, each
agency or department might develop its own fraction
of performance management, without considering the
interdependencies that not only at a macro (or poli-
tical) level, but also at a micro level are relevant to
assess performance outcomes. Also this principle is
crucial to link the financial to the nonfinancial side
of performance management (dual planning system).
This effort has been pursued by both Italy and
Malaysia.
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Performance measures
The sixth, and equally important, lesson drawn from
the comparative study is the need to aggressively adopt
relevant and meaningful performance indicators. This
selection is important if performance indicators are to
help decision makers assess the progress made by the
organization toward the achievement of the pursued
goals. Accordingly, the need to extend the domain of
adopted performance measures from input and process
to output and outcome indicators is a key factor that
may significantly contribute to an effective design and
implementation of PMS (De Waal, 2013).
Also the possibility of extending the identification of
KPIs to national key results areas or strategic reform
areas (SRAs) related to the political level is key for the
evaluation of public policies and to foster a strategic
dialogue and learning between elected officials and
managers. Such experience has been successfully imple-
mented in Malaysia and should be an important bench-
mark for the Italian PMS.
Conclusion
The article highlighted the developments in PMS across
two jurisdictions of differing levels of development. Yet,
the problems in implementing the PMS are similar in
both. The PMS in both jurisdictions has not matured to
measure outcomes and impact. There is little explicit
link between performance and resources expended and
performance evaluation over the longer term is limited.
The cascade of organizational performance targets to
individual performance targets remains elusive in both
the jurisdictions. Performance measurement will be
even more beneficial if the measurement results are
fed into the strategic planning or budget cycle.
Despite these deficits in implementation, PMS devel-
opment exhibits similarities in Italy and Malaysia. Early
reforms were anchored in financial and budgetary
management. These were intended to ensure greater
efficiency and effectiveness in public expenditure.
Additionally, the reforms sought to introduce greater
accountability and transparency in public service deliv-
ery. The reforms also sought to stem the erosion of
public trust in government. The PMS reforms drew
their strength from the elaborate legislative structure
as they did from the political leadership that pressed
home the performance agenda to improve public
services.
The comparative study has revealed that the bureau-
cratic culture can be gradually reshaped to become
more performance oriented if the public sector is
given constant injections of performance management
reform. Structures, such as dedicated performance
management or evaluation units, must be in place at
the center of government as well as at the ministries
and agencies if PMS is to take root in the public sector.
Legislation is important in the execution of PMS
reforms. It lends legitimacy and an aura of formality
to the reforms. However, legislation alone will not take
the reform effort to a higher plane. To enhance perfor-
mance management, and service delivery, elected offi-
cials and department heads should take on the
leadership to see the reforms through. That means
that performance management must not be played at
the level of inputs and outputs. The PMS cycle must be
completed with a good dose of outcomes measurement
to assess goals achievement and effectiveness in public
expenditure.
Notes
1. As core activities of internal control, the legislator
emphasized the following: “benchmarking costs and
yields, monitoring the achievement of objectives and
the proper and efficient allocation of public
resources, and the evaluation over the fairness and
value of administration.”
2. To this end, it requires that each year—
within April 10—the Ministry of Economy and
Finance (MEF) submits to the parliament an
“Economic and Financial” document (DEF). This is
a key step of the planning cycle. Referred to this
document, an updating report must also be sub-
mitted each year to the parliament by the MEF,
within September 20. Within October 15, each year,
the government must then submit to the parliament a
“stability law proposal,” as well as a law proposal for
the approval of the state’s financial plan. The “stabi-
lity law” outlines public finance policies adopted for
the next 3 years by the Italian public sector (not only
at state level).
3. Disputes between political parties also have hindered
progress in the area of system development and cul-
tural change, and this has been exacerbated by the
scarcity of public resources, due to the economic
crisis and by the rigidity of current expenditures.
4. According to the Act No.125/2013, the latter role has
become the only one attributed to this Committee,
whose name has been changed into “National
Authority for Anti-corruption and Transparency in
the Public Administration.”
5. Treasury Circular No. 5: Federal Budget Estimates,
1969. (Kuala Lumpur: Budget Division, Treasury).
6. Treasury Circular No. 11: Preparation of the 1990
Expenditure Proposals under the Modified
Budgeting System (Kuala Lumpur: Budget Division,
Treasury).
7. Performance reporting is carried out yearly through
the exception report. The exception report requires
an agency to submit—by February of the
following year—a report on all performance that are
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inconsistent with the targets set—under- or overa-
chievement—reasons for the inconsistent perfor-
mance and the action to be taken to remedy such
performance to prevent its recurrence.
8. Prime Minister’s Department (1992). Development
Administration Circular No. 3/92: Guidelines on
Micro Accounting System (Kuala Lumpur:
MAMPU).
9. Prime Minister’s Department (1991). Development
Administration Circular No. 6/91: Guidelines on
Productivity Improvement in the Public Sector
(Kuala Lumpur: MAMPU).
10. Prime Minister’s Department (1992). Development
Administration Circular No. 1/92: Guidelines on
Total Quality Management for the Public Service
(Kuala Lumpur: MAMPU).
11. Prime Minister’s Department (1993). Development
Administration Circular No. 3/93: Guidelines on
Clients’ Charter (Kuala Lumpur: MAMPU).
12. Prime Minister’s Department (1996). Development
Administration Circular No. 2/96: Guidelines on
MS ISO 9000 (Kuala Lumpur: MAMPU).
13. Prime Minister’s Department (1999). Development
Administration Circular No. 1/99: Guidelines on
Benchmarking (Kuala Lumpur: MAMPU).
14. Prime Minister’s Department (2005). Development
Administration Circular No. 2/05: Guidelines on
Establishing Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and
Implementing Performance Measurement in
Government Agencies (Putrajaya: MAMPU).
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